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Abstract 
The judicial retirement age in the United Kingdom, which requires judges to retire before 
they reach the age of 70, engages the age discrimination provisions of the Equal Treatment 
Framework Directive [2000/78/EC] and therefore is only lawful if it is shown to be a 
‘objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim.’ This article argues that the 
judicial retirement age is justified and therefore lawful under EU law. In support of this 
argument, I outline a pluralist theory of age discrimination that consists of principles that 
explain when age-differential treatment wrongs people and when that treatment is justified. 
The theory includes the following principles: equality of opportunity; social equality; 
autonomy; respect; and efficiency. After considering these principles, I argue that the 
judicial retirement age in the United Kingdom is justified by advancing equality of 
opportunity and social equality by increasing the turnover of judges and therefore 
increasing the number of vacancies for younger people and underrepresented groups. 
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Introduction 
Mandatory retirement ages were once a widespread and accepted tool for workforce 
planning in the United Kingdom. Increasingly, however, they have been challenged on the 
grounds that they are discriminatory. With the repeal of the national default retirement age, 
employers can now only lawfully implement a retirement age if the retirement age can be 
objectively justified as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.1 As a result, 
large numbers of employers have abandoned mandatory retirement ages and have sought 
other ways of planning the departure of staff.   
However, there are a few industries that continue to use mandatory retirement ages, 
most notably the judiciary. Section 26 of the Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 
requires that judges retire before they reach the age of 70 unless a Minister grants 
permission for particular judges to retire after this age. This retirement age is exempted 
from the Equality Act 2010 prohibition of age distinctions as a result of section 191 and 
schedule 22 of the Equality Act 2010, which provide that age distinctions are lawful when 
an employer must implement an age distinction due ‘to the requirement of an enactment.’2 
In a recent article, Alysia Blackham (2017a) has argued that the judicial retirement 
age in the United Kingdom is nonetheless likely to violate EU law. This is because the 
judicial retirement age engages Article 3(1) of the Equal Treatment Framework Directive 
[2000/78/EC] (‘the Framework Directive’) which prohibits unequal treatment because of 
age in the context of ‘employment and working conditions’ unless the treatment is 
‘objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim…and if the means of achieving 
that aim are appropriate and necessary.’ Blackman’s view is that the government will 
struggle to demonstrate that the judicial retirement age is objectively and reasonably 
justified, and therefore the retirement age may violate the Framework Directive.3  
In this article, I argue that the judicial retirement age is compliant with the 
Framework Directive and lawful because the judicial retirement age can be objectively and 
reasonably justified. After setting out a number of arguments from the case law, Hansard 
debates and academic commentary on retirement ages, I consider a theory of age 
discrimination that consists of a range of principles that can determine when age-
differential treatment is justified and when it is not, and I apply this theory to judicial 
retirement ages. The theory of age discrimination consists of the following principles: 
efficiency; equality of opportunity; social equality; autonomy and respect.4 After 
considering these principles, I argue that the judicial retirement age is a proportionate 
means of advancing equality of opportunity and social equality by the policy creating 
opportunities for younger workers which can in turn advance the aim of increasing the 
diversity of the judiciary. However, I explain that we should reject the unpersuasive 
argument propounded in UK and EU cases that retirement ages are justified on the basis 
that they are an efficient proxy for declining performance.  
 
Determining the Legality of the Judicial Retirement Age 
Requires a Theory of Age Discrimination 
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A theory of age discrimination is essential in identifying unlawful age discrimination under 
the Framework Directive and the Equality Act 2010 because the Framework Directive and 
the Equality Act 2010, which are both effective in the UK, distinguish justified from 
unjustified age-differential treatment with only the former being lawful. Article 6 of the 
Framework Directive, for example, asserts that ‘[m]ember States may provide that 
differences of treatment on grounds of age shall not constitute discrimination, if, within the 
context of national law, they are objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate 
aim…and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.’ Section 13(2) 
of the Equality Act 2010 (which implements article 6 of the Framework Directive) provides 
that age-differential treatment does not constitute unlawful age discrimination if the 
treatment is a ‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.’ 
Determining whether the judicial retirement age (which engages the Framework 
Directive5) is objectively and reasonably justified requires that we apply the proportionality 
test as adopted in UK and EU case law, which requires that we determine whether the 
judicial retirement age is suitable to achieving a legitimate aim, necessary to achieve that 
aim and that it does not impose burdens or cause harms to other legitimate interests that 
outweigh the objectives achieved.6 This proportionality test requires a moral theory of age 
discrimination because the process of identifying ‘legitimate’ aims that justify age-
differential treatment requires that we identify the objectives that are important enough to 
justify treating people unequally on the grounds of age, and the final stage of the 
proportionality test requires weighing and choosing between competing moral 
considerations about the importance of the value pursued by the impugned measure and 
the discriminatory harms of that measure (see Möller, 2012). It follows that determining 
whether the judicial retirement age is objectively justified and therefore lawful under the 
Framework Directive, we must engage with theoretical questions about the principles that 
determine when it is unjustified to treat people less favourably on the grounds of age. This 
article outlines a theory of age discrimination to support this process. 
 
An Overview of the Arguments on Judicial Retirement Ages 
from the Hansard debates, Case Law and Academic Literature 
The need for a theory of age discrimination also arises because the debate on the judicial 
retirement age in the United Kingdom (from the case law, Hansard debates and academic 
literature) lacks an open assessment into the competing interests and principles at stake. 
The Parliamentary debates on Judicial Pensions and Retirement Bill reveals support 
for the judicial retirement age of 70 on the grounds that the policy maintains public 
confidence in the judiciary by responding to the public perception that the judiciary is too 
old and therefore ‘out of touch’ (HC Deb 3rd December 1993 vol. 215, col. 435). The 
assumption is that a retirement age of 70 removes older judges that the public may consider 
to be past their best. Further to this, it was said that the UK ‘need[s] the attitudes and 
abilities of a younger, more in-touch judiciary’ and that ‘[n]ew blood prevents the judiciary 
from becoming stale and out of touch’ (HC Deb 3rd December 1993 vol. 215, col. 458). 
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The statements reflect stereotypes about the capability of older judges but it is not 
explained why age generalisations are justified in this context when we would consider 
race or sex stereotyping unacceptable as a reason to remove a person from their work. As 
Mr Nicholls stated in the Parliamentary debates, there is a ‘duty not merely to accept what 
the public feel but to try to inform them as well’ and that there is no reason or logic ‘in 
saying that, simply because someone is born before a particular date, he is incapable of 
carrying out his functions’ (HC Deb 3rd December 1993 vol. 215, col. 455). We need to 
examine age stereotyping and the reason for the acceptability or otherwise of 
generalisations about age in the context of the judicial retirement age. 
The ET in White v Ministry of Justice [2014] ET/2201298/2013 held that the 
compulsory retirement of a circuit judge at 70 years of age was objectively justified and 
therefore compliant with the Framework Directive. The judicial retirement age, the ET 
held, is a proportionate means of achieving the following legitimate aims: (1) promoting 
inter-generational fairness by creating opportunities for younger people; (2) preserving 
judges’ dignity by avoiding capability assessments for older judges; and (3) maintaining 
public confidence by ensuring that the public do not form the belief that judges are 
undergoing age-based intellectual decline.  
In finding these aims legitimate, the ET applied the leading UK authority in age 
discrimination law – Seldon v Clarkson, Wright and Jakes [2012] UKSC 16, which held 
that measures disadvantaging older people are capable of being justified by furthering the 
aim of promoting employment for younger people and that a mandatory retirement can be 
justified by avoiding the humiliation of capability assessments for older workers.  
It was not explained by the ET in White or the reasoning by the Supreme Court in 
Seldon why it is justified to force older people out of work to provide opportunities for 
younger people. These judgments also failed to offer analysis for why it is justified to 
dismiss older workers to avoid capability assessments. A theory of age discrimination can 
help to examine whether these aims are capable of justifying judicial retirement ages. 
 The lack of theorising on age discrimination is also present in EU cases. For 
example, the CJEU in Commission v Hungary C-286/12 [2013] 1 CMLR 44 held that 
Hungary’s policy to compulsory retire judges, prosecutors and notaries at the age of 62 was 
unjustified age discrimination under Art 2 and 6 of the Framework Directive because the 
‘provisions at issue abruptly and significantly lowered the age limit for compulsory 
retirement, without introducing transitional measures of such a kind as to protect the 
legitimate expectations of the persons concerned’ [68]. Nonetheless, the CJEU held that 
the policy did support legitimate aims, namely, ‘establishing a more balanced age structure 
facilitating access for young lawyers to the professions of judge, prosecutor and notary’ 
and ‘to prevent possible disputes concerning employees’ fitness to work beyond a certain 
age’ [62]. In finding this, the CJEU applied well-established authority (see Fuchs [2011] 3 
CMLR 47 at [50]) on the types of aims capable of justifying compulsory retirement ages. 
However, the CJEU offered no explanation for why it is justified to favour young lawyers 
to enter the profession at the expense of older judges and no explanation for why it is 
justified to dismiss workers on the basis that older judges may require capability 
assessments.  
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To find some deeper theorising on age discrimination that can be relevant to 
understanding the morality and legality of judicial retirement ages, we can examine the 
reasoning in the wider case law on retirement ages. Lady Hale in Seldon held that social 
policy (including the aim of protecting older people from incapacity assessment and using 
a retirement age to create more opportunities for younger people) can justify retirement 
ages even though such aims are incapable of justifying distinctions on other protected 
grounds, such as race or sex, because 'age is different… not “binary” in nature (man or 
woman, black or white, gay or straight) but a continuum which changes over time… 
younger people will eventually benefit from a provision which favours older employees, 
such as an incremental pay scale; but older employees will already have benefitted from a 
provision which favours younger people, such as a mandatory retirement age' [4].  
Similarly in R (The Incorporated Trustees of the National Council on Ageing (Age 
Concern England) v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform C-
388/07 [2009] ECR I-1569, which concerned the UK’s mandatory retirement age, 
Advocate General Mazák of the CJEU asserted that ‘[a]ge is not by its nature a "suspect 
ground", at least not so much as for example race or sex' because age is a ‘“fluid” 
characteristic that changes over time, and age distinctions are widespread in law’ [74]. This 
explains, he argued, why the Framework Directive permits EU member states to pass laws 
that treat people differently on the grounds of age, such as mandatory retirement ages.  
The approach in Seldon and Age Concern England recognises that age distinctions, 
such as retirement ages, can be compatible with equality of opportunity because as people 
age they will experience the benefit and detriment of being young and the benefits and 
detriments of being older and that this means age distinctions are not as offensive to 
people’s dignity as other forms of differential treatment. The problem with this reasoning, 
however, is that age distinctions, such as retirement ages, do not necessarily contribute to 
equality of opportunity because age distinctions are unlikely to affect people in the same 
way. For example, it is unlikely that every worker in a workplace with a retirement age 
will experience that retirement age in the same way. Some may leave the employer before 
reaching the retirement age and may choose to work for an employer that does not have a 
retirement age. The retirement age may also be changed or removed at particular times. A 
theory of age discrimination can examine to what extent, if at all, we can justify age-
differential treatment by equality of opportunity as suggested in Seldon and Age Concern 
England. 
There is relatively small amount of academic literature on the judicial retirement 
age in the UK but Alysia Blackham (2017a) has offered extensive commentary. Blackham 
has outlined a range of possible aims to justify the policy, including the retirement age 
being used to dismiss older judges in order to respond to public perception that older judges 
may lack capacity, the aim of the retirement age avoiding the need to subject older judges 
to capability assessments and the aim that the retirement age can facilitate new and more 
diverse judicial appointments. The UK courts, Blackham argues, are unlikely to accept the 
aim of securing public confidence in the judiciary since this aim is based on ageist 
assumptions about the capability of older people. However, in line with the findings by the 
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Supreme Court in Seldon, using the judicial retirement age to avoid subjecting older judges 
to the indignity of capability assessments and using retirement ages to create more judicial 
appointments will be legitimate aims.  
Blackham argues that the judicial retirement age may nonetheless be unjustified 
and therefore unlawful under the Framework Directive. The reason is that, in Blackham’s 
view, the harms of the judicial retirement age outweigh the alleged benefits. This is because 
the judicial retirement age can have the effect of ending some judges careers in the legal 
profession in the UK due to the Guide to Judicial Conduct and the judicial terms of 
appointment providing that judges in England and Wales should not offer legal advice or 
work as an advocate after retirement. Further, only approximately two-thirds of judges 
choose to retire before their 69th birthday and the vast majority of judges retiring before 
the retirement age of 70.7 This means, Blackham argues, that the judicial retirement must 
only have a modest impact on the aim of creating new vacancies and only a modest impact 
on the aim of preventing older judges from undergoing capability assessments. Blackham 
argues that this possible modest gain does not justify the harm of the policy potentially 
ending the careers of older judges.  
 
A Theory of Age Discrimination  
I have established above that a theory of age discrimination is essential to determining the 
legality of the judicial retirement age in the United Kingdom but a detailed discussion of 
such a theory has been largely absent from the discussions on the judicial retirement age. 
Further to offering a theory of age discrimination that can distinguish justified from 
unjustified age-differential treatment and therefore determine the legality of the judicial 
retirement age, we must consider the features of age and ageing and the significance this 
has in people’s lives. Age is significant as both a biological and a social phenomenon. 
People of different ages have different physical features and functioning that is caused by 
the development and ageing process (Bond, 1993). Developments include major physical 
and mental changes, including changes in body shape, growth in height and weight, 
development of coordination and balance. Ageing concerns features that make people more 
susceptible to the things that will lead to death. It is a universal process experienced by 
everyone except those who die young.  
Age is also a major component of the social structure linked to the assignment of 
status, social roles and responsibilities (Eisenstadt, 1956). For example, age classification 
determines when we are 'supposed to enter school, leave school, marry, drink, vote, smoke, 
get called up for military duty in a real column, draw a retirement pension, and a great deal 
else in between the registered birth and the registered death' (Young, 1989: 109). 
In constructing a theory of age discrimination, we must consider principles that 
capture these features of age and ageing. An important starting point that can be drawn out 
from the above is that age can be a proxy for certain attributes and abilities, whether 
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biologically or socially constructed. For example, the age-based structuring of society 
means that age is used as a proxy for a wide range of characteristics, including 'intellectual 
and emotional maturity (e.g. minimum ages for entering school), readiness to assume adult 
responsibilities (e.g. minimum ages for voting, drinking, driving and marriage), physical 
strength or speed of response (e.g. maximum ages for policemen, bus drivers, or air-line 
pilots), economic productivity (e.g. age of retirement), and various types of debility (e.g. 
ages for eligibility for medical services and social services)’ (Neugarten, 1996: 822).  
Using age as a proxy in this way can be efficient by maximising a particular social 
good. Efficient in this context means achieving a particular goal with a minimum amount 
of waste, effort or costs. The efficiency value of using age as a proxy is present when using 
age is less costly than directly measuring the thing age is a proxy for. For example, the 
National Institute for Care and Health Excellence (2013) recommend that there should be 
restricted access to in vitro fertilisation for women over 43 for the reason that it is unlikely 
to be successful for these women. Age here is used as an efficient proxy for the possibility 
of the procedure resulting in pregnancy. It is efficient because it is less costly to assume 
women over 43 years of age are unlikely to benefit from in vitro fertilisation than it is to 
assess each woman’s likelihood of benefitting from the treatment.  
Another example is criminal responsibility. England and Wales has a criminal age 
of responsibility set at 10 years of age because children below this age are unlikely to have 
the capacity to understand what they had done wrong and why.8 While some children under 
10 years of age have the mental capabilities to be responsible for crimes, a large proportion 
do not. Using age as a proxy here is efficient because age is a more objective and 
measurable target than the thing age is a proxy for. For example, without an age proxy for 
criminal responsibility, we would have to assess the mental capacities of each child under 
10 suspected of a crime. It is more efficient to assume that all children under 10 have no 
criminal responsibility since we know that most children at this age lack this trait. This use 
of an age proxy promotes criminal justice. 
Age distinctions are also useful in other ways. Society has become age-regimented 
with different roles assigned to different age groups. We expect children to be in education, 
adults in work and older people retired. This age-based structure ensures that we organise 
the chronological order of people’s life activities to ensure they gain skills before having 
them put to practice (see Gosseries, 2014). For example, we force children to start learning 
early in their lives because it is efficient that they learn skills necessary for work life before 
engaging in employment. 
It is important to consider why efficiency can justify age-differential treatment. 
Efficiency is not an intrinsic good. It can only justify a course of action if the aim is to 
maximise an end that is valuable. Efficient slavery, for example, is not justified, but the 
efficient use of healthcare resources is a good thing that we ought to aim for. We can 
understand this demand from efficiency as a demand to maximise welfare. For example, 
using age proxies in healthcare (such as restricting access to in vitro fertilisation to women 
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under 43 years of age) has the consequence of efficiently distributing resources which in 
turn can maximise welfare in society.  
The efficiency of using age proxies and sequencing people’s lives by age explains 
why we consider many age-based social structures justified, including age distinctions 
limiting the ability of young people to work in the labour market, restricting driving to 
people over 17, having an age of consent at 16, film classifications by age and alcohol 
restrictions by age. All of these examples use age to promote valuable social ends. A theory 
of age discrimination should therefore incorporate an efficiency principle.  
However, the fact that something can be a reliable proxy does not necessarily justify 
its use as a proxy. Sometimes efficient age proxies can treat people unjustly. For example, 
an employer may justify not hiring women because women are more likely to need time 
out of the labour market. Even if this policy is efficient as a way to reduce costs to the 
business, it is still unjustified because it violates a number of principles, including 
undermining equality between men and women. We must, therefore, also consider other 
principles that are relevant to evaluating the justifiability of age distinctions.   
 Equality of opportunity, for example, is an important principle to consider in 
relation to age discrimination. Equality of opportunity holds that it is wrong for someone 
to be worse off when they are not directly responsible for their condition of being worse 
off (see Mason, 2006). The sorts of things we are not responsible for include the 
circumstances a person finds themselves in, including our genetics, our ethnicity and our 
upbringing. There are a number of different conceptions of equality of opportunity, but the 
major accounts are equality of opportunity to resources (endorsed by Dworkin, 1981) and 
equality of opportunity to welfare (endorsed by Arneson, 1989).  
Equality of opportunity seems to account for many of our intuitions about 
discrimination because a major reason why we find discrimination wrong is we recognise 
that it is unfair to impose a disadvantage on the grounds of a characteristic that the 
individual is powerless to change. Many of the protected characteristics in the Equality Act 
2010, such as race, sex and nationality, are traits that people are powerless to change. Age 
is also factor outside our control since at any one time we are a particular age, but, as 
highlighted by Lady Hale in Seldon, age is changeable since we each take turns 
experiencing different age groups and this has implications for understanding the morality 
of age discrimination. It means that people may experience the different advantages and 
disadvantages associated with different age groups and that age-differential treatment can 
be compatible with equality of opportunity measured over a complete life.9 The nature of 
age means we can use age distinctions to compensate detriments at one time of life with 
gains at another time of life, and this can work to justify those age-based distinctions, for 
example, in job recruitment and terms of employment, which are based on stable policies 
that apply uniformly to all people. This means that if we measure distributive equality over a 
complete life – from birth to death – then we can justify age-differential treatment if it is likely 
to secure equal resources or welfare distributed over a complete life.10 A theory of age 
discrimination, therefore, should incorporate the principle of equality of opportunity. 
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However, it is clear that age-differential treatment can still be wrong even if it is 
consistent with equality of opportunity. Consider a policy that creates severe disparity in 
resources and welfare between the young and the old but maintains equal resources and 
welfare measured over a complete life. This may redistribute wealth to the young leaving 
older people in poverty. The fact that each individual may experience the same levels of 
poverty over their complete lives does not make the policy justified.11 We must therefore 
invoke other principles to explain why this type of age discrimination wrongs people. To 
explain why and when age discrimination is wrong, we must identify the principles that 
explain why and when it morally wrong to treat people less favourably on the grounds of 
age even if this means all people have equal opportunities over a complete life.  
Social equality can explain why this unequal treatment is wrong. This principle 
holds that discrimination is wrong when it creates conditions where people are unable to 
interact as equals.12 Social equality, unlike equality of opportunity, does not directly 
concern any specific distribution but instead concerns a particular ideal that people should 
be able to regard one another as equals.13 Any form of social hierarchies that convey a 
ranking of human beings is wrongful inequality on this account. Under the social equality 
account, the problem with a policy that creates a severe disparity of welfare and resources 
between different age groups is that it creates conditions in which the fortunate groups can 
dominate, oppress or exploit others.  
Social equality, however, can justify some forms of age-differential treatment. For 
example, positive action in favour of disadvantaged age groups can be a means to achieve 
social equality, rather than a breach of the principle. Positive action, such as offering work 
training to young people or initiatives to help older people back into employment, can 
facilitate the participation of marginalised age groups. 
Social equality as an explanation of discrimination, however, is limited by its 
presupposing that the wrongfulness of discrimination is located in its effects on social 
groups. Certainly, discrimination can have bad effects, but the wrongness of direct forms 
of discrimination seems to concern, at least partly, what brings about the effects.14 For 
example, it is usually explained that laws that limit marriage to opposite-sex couples is 
wrong because in refusing gay people the right to recognise their relationships as 
‘marriages,’ it sends the message that same-sex couples are inferior to heterosexual 
couples.15 Therefore, in locating the wrong of discrimination, we also need to look not just 
at its effects but also at the message conveyed by the discriminator.   
The respect account of discrimination attempts to do this by finding that 
discrimination is wrong when it conveys disrespectful messages.16 This account relates to 
the Kantian principle that certain acts are intrinsically wrong because those acts pursue 
impermissible ends. This idea is that human beings have an intrinsic worth or dignity which 
requires that we treat people in a respectful way as ends and not mere means. The 
impermissible ends can include judgments of prejudice and hostility that convey the 
message that a person has lower social worth and usefulness, including acts of racism, 
sexism and ageism. Determining whether age-differential treatment is disrespectful and 
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therefore wrong requires that we determine whether it is motivated by prejudice, 
stereotyping and/or conveys a message that certain age groups have a diminished moral or 
social worth.  
Some have argued that the respect principle does not explain age discrimination 
because age discrimination has not been a practice marked by prejudice, dislike and 
hostility. For example, Samuel Issacharoff and Erica Worth Harris (1997) have argued that 
age discrimination laws in the US, which protect older people from discrimination, do not 
protect any group that is socially reviled, penurious, or cut off from the mainstream of 
society. Similarly, Lord Walker in R (Carson and Reynolds) v Secretary of State for Work 
and Pensions [2005] UKHL 37 [60] argued that age distinctions are different from other 
forms of discrimination because classifying people by age is not 'intrinsically demeaning' 
in the way that race or sex classifications are. 
However, both young and old have been subject to demeaning ideas about their 
worth as people. For example, age discrimination can demean older people by conveying 
that they are burdensome to society by taking up too many resources. The young, in 
contrast, are often stereotyped as immature, unruly and violent. As Grimley Evans (2003: 
20) has highlighted, '[a]geist prejudice is deeply and widely pervasive in British society,' 
and '[i]t is treated as in some way "natural," even by many older people.' It is important, 
then, that a theory of age discrimination incorporates a respect principle.  
Autonomy can also explain why and when age-differential treatment wrongs 
people. Gardner (1998: 170) defines autonomy as ‘the ideal of a life substantially lived 
through the successive valuable choices of the person who lives it, where valuable choices 
are choices from among an adequate range of valuable options.’ Discrimination violates 
autonomy by attaching costs to a trait that people's choices can make no difference to. For 
example, in the health sphere, a doctor deciding that older patients do not have priority for 
certain drugs can lead to older people missing out on treatment that can help them retain 
their independence at a time of life when older people face health challenges to their 
autonomy. Barriers to older workers training for certain professions, such as medicine, 
prevent older workers from having control over their lives. Laws restricting voting rights, 
driving and drinking alcohol significantly undermine young people’s autonomy. Like 
social equality, however, the principle of autonomy can work to justify some forms of age 
distinctions which work as positive action in favour of age groups that typically suffer from 
lower levels of autonomy. 
A theory of age discrimination, then, should include each of the principles outlined 
above, including considerations of efficiency, equality of opportunity, social equality, 
autonomy and respect. This pluralist approach to age discrimination draws together a range 
of principles that have plausible explanations of the wrong of discrimination.17 It creates 
the opportunity to determine the legality of treatment that engages the age discrimination 
provisions of the Framework Directive. 
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This theory of age discrimination may also be applicable to other grounds of 
discrimination in EU law, including race, sex and disability, to determine why and when 
that treatment is wrong. The academic literature has identified a range of principles 
explaining the general wrong of discrimination but prominent answers have included the 
principles of the theory of age discrimination outlined in this article, including equality of 
opportunity (Segall, 2012), social equality (Bagenstos, 2013), autonomy (Gardner, 1998) 
and respect (Hellman, 2004).  
To determine whether an age distinction is justified, we should consider the extent 
to which the age distinction violates or promotes these principles. In the next section, I 
explain how this pluralist theory of age discrimination can assist in determining the legality 
of the judicial retirement age. 
 
 
How the Pluralist Theory of Age Discrimination Can Determine 
the Legality and Morality of Judicial Retirement Ages  
We can divide the process of assessing the legality of judicial retirement ages into four 
stages. The first stage is to determine whether the judicial retirement age engages the direct 
or indirect age discrimination provisions of the Framework Directive. If the treatment does 
engage these provisions, then we must undertake the proportionality test of Article 6 of the 
Framework Directive, which requires an assessment of whether the judicial retirement age 
is ‘objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim…and if the means of achieving 
that aim are appropriate and necessary’. In the second stage of assessing whether the 
retirement age is lawful, and further to undertaking the proportionality test, we must assess 
whether the treatment is suitable for achieving a legitimate aim. This means that the 
retirement age must be rationally connected to a legitimate aim. If it is not suitable to 
achieving a legitimate aim, then the treatment is disproportionate and unlawful. If the 
treatment is suitable to a legitimate aim, then we move to the third stage to assess whether 
the treatment is necessary to achieve that aim. A measure will only be necessary if there 
are no clear alternative forms of treatment that can achieve the legitimate aim without the 
equivalent discriminatory impact. If the treatment is unnecessary, it is disproportionate and 
therefore unlawful age discrimination. If it is necessary, then we move to the fourth stage, 
which requires an assessment of whether the judicial retirement age causes harms that 
outweigh the objectives achieved. If the treatment passes each of these stages, it is 
proportionate and therefore lawful. 
Each of the principles of the pluralist theory of age discrimination outlined in this 
article can assist in this process. For example, the principles can establish when impugned 
treatment engages the direct and indirect discrimination provisions by identifying when an 
individual is treated less favourably on the grounds of age and identifying when age-neutral 
treatment disadvantages particular age groups. In most cases, this assistance will be 
unnecessary because the ordinary process of identifying direct or indirect discrimination 
usually only requires a common-sense assessment of whether a person has suffered a 
Stuart Goosey 
Accepted, non-proofed version (12.9.18) 
International Journal of Discrimination and the Law. Advance online publication.  
https://doi.org/10.1177/1358229118792332 
 
12 
 
disadvantage. For example, it is common sense that denying a person a job because of age 
is treatment that engages the direct discrimination provisions. However, the theory can be 
useful in harder cases. For example, the theory can determine when age-based comments 
engage the direct discrimination provisions. Offensive, insulting remarks relating to age or 
comments that reflect prejudice or age stereotyping violates the respect principle and 
therefore engage the direct discrimination provisions.16 
The pluralist theory of age discrimination is particularly helpful at the second stage 
which requires that we identify the sort of aims that can justify age-differential treatment. 
Age-differential treatment, I have explained, can be used as an efficient proxy, but it can 
also assist in securing greater equality of opportunity in society, promote social inclusion 
and the autonomy of disadvantaged groups. It is essential, then, to consider these principles 
not only in determining when a person has a right not to be treated differently on the 
grounds of age but also to determine when impugned age-differential treatment is justified 
under the proportionality test.  According to the pluralist theory of age discrimination, 
legitimate aims capable of justifying age-differential treatment should include aims that 
enhance efficiency, equality of opportunity, social equality and/or autonomy.  
 
The respect principle also identifies illegitimate aims as aims that reflect age 
stereotyping or prejudice, or any attitude that particular age groups have a diminished 
social or moral worth are illegitimate. According to the respect principle, no one should 
suffer from communications that they have an inferior status because of their age. This 
means that it is essential that judges hold that public-policy goals or private interests do not 
justify acting on derogatory beliefs.  
The pluralist theory of age discrimination can also assist in the final stage which 
requires assessing whether the judicial retirement age causes harms that outweigh the 
objectives achieved. I have established that age-differential treatment can violate equality 
of opportunity, social equality, autonomy and respect but age-differential treatment can 
also sometimes respect equality of opportunity, social equality, autonomy, respect and 
efficiency. According to the pluralist theory of age discrimination, a judicial retirement age 
is only justified and lawful if there is an appropriate balance between promoting and/or 
violating these principles. To determine whether the retirement age is objectively justified, 
we must therefore calculate the extent the retirement age violates one or more of the 
principles of the pluralist theory of age discrimination and calculate the extent the measure 
advances any of these principles.18 
 
Applying the Pluralist Theory of Age Discrimination to Judicial 
Retirement Ages 
The first stage of applying the theory is straightforward. Judicial retirement ages can force 
people to retire at the age of 70 and therefore the judicial retirement age treats older people 
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less favourably than other age groups. This means the judicial retirement age engages the 
direct age discrimination provisions of the Framework Directive.  
Moving on to the second stage, we must identify whether the retirement age 
promotes a legitimate aim by advancing one or more of the principles of the pluralist theory 
of age discrimination, including equality of opportunity, social equality, autonomy and/or 
efficiency. Aims are illegitimate if they reflect age stereotyping, prejudice and/or 
demeaning ideas about particular age groups.  
To identify possible legitimate aims, we can return to the aims identified in the UK 
and EU cases discussed above. For example, in White, the ET held that the judicial 
retirement age was justified and lawful. The ET accepted the following as legitimate aims: 
(1) avoiding capability assessments for older judges, thereby preserving judges' dignity; 
(2) maintaining public confidence in the judiciary by ensuring that judges are not perceived 
as undergoing age-based intellectual decline; and (3) creating employment opportunities 
for younger people. The leading case on age discrimination law, Seldon, held that these 
social-policy objectives are capable of justifying retirement ages. In turn, the CJEU held in 
Rosenbladt that EU member states can use these aims to justify retirement ages. 
The first aim reflects the efficiency principle of the pluralist theory of age 
discrimination. This holds that age can be used as a proxy when it is less costly and more 
objectively measurable than measuring the thing that age is a proxy for. The first aim 
identified in White assumes that age is a proxy for declining performance and that a 
retirement age can be an efficient way of dismissing incompetent judges while avoiding 
the costs associated with dismissing judges after a capability assessment. The legitimacy 
of this aim, however, depends on whether age is in fact an accurate proxy for declining 
performance. There is, however, no compelling empirical evidence to support the general 
claim that job performance declines with age (see McEvoy and Cascio, 1989; Ng and 
Feldman, 2008). Age is an unreliable proxy for performance and therefore we should avoid 
targeting older people for dismissal on the grounds that their capability is declining due to 
ageing. 
Further, the first two aims identified above (using the judicial retirement age to 
avoid capability assessments and to maintain public confidence in the judiciary), reflect 
negative stereotypes about the capabilities of older people and therefore violate the respect 
principle of the pluralist theory of age discrimination. The aims assume that older judges 
need to be removed from employment because they may not be capable of doing their jobs 
effectively. This negative generalisation is likely to be inaccurate for a large number of 
judges since people can age differently with many retaining high intellectual ability till late 
in life. Ageing may include declines in certain capabilities, but it can also offer the benefits 
of experience. Further, even if we were to assume older people have declining capability 
at a general level, it still wrongs people and is empirically unsound to make assumptions 
about capability without assessing individuals’ actual capabilities. The aims should not, 
therefore, be capable of justifying judicial retirement ages. 
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Lady Hale in Seldon expressed sympathy for the view that the first aim is 
‘suspiciously like stereotyping’ because it used age as a proxy for poor performance. 
However, the Supreme Court held that they were bound by the EU case law, such as 
Rosenbladt v Oellerking Gebaudereinigungsgesellschaft mbH C-45/09 [2011] 1 CMLR 32 
which held that avoiding ‘unseemly debates about capacity’ is a legitimate aim. This means 
that the UK courts and the CJEU have set a precedent that this to be a legitimate aim. 
However, the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill proposes that CJEU decisions decided 
before the UK leaves the EU will have the status of Supreme Court decisions after the UK 
exits the EU. It is possible for the UK Supreme Court to take this as an opportunity to 
overrule judgments of the CJEU should it consider that justice requires departure from that 
precedent. It is possible (and recommended by this article) that the UK courts, after the UK 
withdraws from the EU, should hold the aim of using retirement ages to avoid capability 
assessments as an illegitimate aim. 
The judicial retirement age may less effective at achieving these aims than 
treatment that does not treat people unequally on the grounds of age. It is plausible, for 
example, that capability assessments can be effective in maintaining public confidence in 
the capabilities of the judiciary and that these assessments can be designed to avoid 
humiliating a judge. For example, the judiciary can introduce an appraisal system that 
judges must undertake at regular intervals (see Blackham, 2017a). This avoids targeting 
judges at particular ages and avoids implying older judges are incompetent. This can render 
the aim of using a judicial retirement age to maintain public confidence in the judiciary 
unnecessary.  
In contrast, the third aim – to use a judicial retirement age to open vacancies that 
can be filled by younger workers – is rightly considered by the case law to be a legitimate 
aim. This rationale for retirement ages concerns the promotion of inter-generational 
fairness which can promote the principles of social equality and equality of opportunity of 
the pluralist theory of age discrimination. Unlike the aims of avoiding capability 
assessments and maintaining public confidence in the judiciary, inter-generational fairness 
does not violate the respect principle by stereotyping people. Instead, inter-generational 
fairness aims to distribute opportunities to particular age groups by balancing the legitimate 
interests of different age groups. For example, a judicial retirement age can promote 
equality of opportunity by requiring access to income and work to be withheld from those 
who have held an office for a considerable time (older judges) and given to age groups who 
have not (younger people).  
By distributing jobs and promotion opportunities from older workers to younger 
groups, a retirement age gives younger people a chance to gain experience and develop 
their careers, and in doing so, it can aim for a fair share of work opportunities across 
generations. This argument assumes that older workers have had a 'fair innings' in their 
careers and younger people have not yet had a fair innings.  
 Further, the judicial retirement age can support social equality by creating 
vacancies to groups that are underrepresented in the judiciary, including women. Women 
have been disproportionately excluded from the judiciary. In 2017, only 28% of judges 
were women and there are currently only two women Supreme Court Justices.20 The 
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judicial retirement age can help increase the level of social and political influence of 
women by increasing the number vacancies in the judiciary that women may apply for.  
 But it must be established whether the retirement age can successfully open 
vacancies for younger people and increase the representation of women in the judiciary. 
Sandra Fredman (2003) has argued that retirement ages do not necessarily create vacancies 
because retirement ages do not necessarily create more jobs and opportunities at the macro 
level. This is because there are not a finite number of jobs where opportunities arise simply 
because people are forced from their jobs.  
However, Fredman also rightly notes that while jobs are not finite at a macro level, 
individual workforces do offer a relatively fixed number of jobs. The nature of the judicial 
office ensures that the judiciary is a relatively inflexible workforce. There are not the 
methods to remove judges that are available in the private sector workforces. A retirement 
age offers a degree of flexibility to open vacancies to younger people who may otherwise 
not have the opportunity. There is evidence that the judicial retirement age has contributed 
to increasing the number of women judges – there are a higher proportion of women 
replacing retired judges than were previously in judicial office (see Blackham, 2017b). 
  Blackham (2017a) argues that, despite the fact that the judicial retirement age can 
contribute to a more diverse judiciary, the judicial retirement age is unfair because the 
retirement age will not affect people equally – many judges will voluntarily leave the 
judiciary before reaching the retirement age and may choose to work for an employer that 
does not have a retirement age. The policy may also be changed, for example, with the 
retirement age increasing. This will mean that some will receive greater detriment from the 
policy than others. The retirement age, therefore, is unlikely to secure complete equality of 
opportunity.  
Nonetheless, the retirement age can still create conditions that are more equal than 
they would be without a retirement age and therefore can increase fairness overall. It can 
do this by opening opportunities for groups who may not have promotion opportunities if 
the older judges did not retire. While a judicial retirement age will not solve the problem 
of the lack of diversity in the judiciary, it may have the effect of speeding up the process, 
and since there is a pressing need to achieve greater diversity, this aim should be capable 
of justifying the policy. Relying on the diversity problem sorting itself out over time as 
older judges retire voluntarily may mean very slow progress.  
Moving on to the third stage of applying the pluralist theory of age discrimination, 
it is appropriate to conclude that the judicial retirement age of 70 is reasonably necessary 
to achieve the legitimate aim of creating opportunities for younger people. A retirement 
age set at 70 is more likely to achieve the aim than a retirement age set at an older age or a 
policy of not having a retirement age. This is because a judicial retirement age will prompt 
a higher turnover of judges leading to a greater possibility of opening job opportunities for 
younger people and underrepresented groups. 
The fourth stage of assessing the legality of the judicial retirement age requires 
determining whether the retirement age promotes the principles of the pluralist theory of 
age discrimination, including social equality and equality of opportunity, to the extent that 
justifies the seriousness of the interference with the older judges’ interest in being free from 
the detriment of the retirement age.  
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The pluralist theory of age discrimination recognises that while retirement ages can 
promote equality of opportunity and social equality by granting work opportunities to 
younger people and underrepresented groups, this compromises social equality from the 
perspective of older workers since it hinders their capacity to participate in society through 
productive work. It follows that retired judges are incapable of participating in society as 
equals with their younger peers. The retirement age also harms the autonomy principle by 
forcing judges out of socially productive work and therefore preventing them from having 
control over their work lives. Further, as Blackham (2017a) notes, the judicial retirement 
age can come at the cost of losing the expertise of the older experienced judges. To 
determine whether the judicial retirement age is proportionate, we must establish whether 
the policy achieves a fair balance between the interests of older workers and younger 
people. 
As outlined above, Blackham (2017a) identifies two reasons for holding that the 
judicial retirement age is disproportionate. Firstly, the judicial retirement age can have a 
severe effect on judges lives by ending judges’ professional legal careers. This is because 
the Guide to Judicial Conduct and the judicial terms of appointment hold that judges in 
England and Wales should not offer legal advice or work as an advocate after retirement. 
Secondly, about two-thirds of judges choose to retire before their 69th birthday and the 
vast majority of judges retire before the retirement age of 70 meaning that the judicial 
retirement must only have a modest impact on improving the diversity of the judiciary and 
increasing opportunities for younger people.  
However, there are cogent reasons for concluding that the judicial retirement age 
of 70 achieves a proper balance between the interests of older judges and younger people 
and is therefore objectively justified under the Framework Directive. As Kavanagh (2010: 
226) has argued, ‘the severity of the rights violation’ is a relevant consideration in 
determining the appropriate deference to the original decision-maker in forming the 
impugned policy. The more serious the detriment the policy has on a particular group of 
people, the greater the gain in a public interest there must be for the policy to be 
proportionate.18 The more modest the detrimental impact of the policy, the more modest 
the gain in public interest is needed to justify the policy. As established above, the judicial 
retirement age only has a limited adverse impact on the judiciary with the vast majority of 
judges retiring before the judicial retirement age, which means that only a modest gain in 
the public interest should be sufficient to justify the policy. While the retirement age can 
have a detrimental impact on individual judges, for example, if a judge failed to build up a 
sufficient pension before the age of 70, the policy can be justified by its positive effects it 
has on the judiciary as a whole in increasing turn-over and diversity and the fact that there 
is only a detrimental impact for a small number of judges. In other words, the benefits of 
the judicial retirement age on the judiciary as a whole outweigh its detrimental impact on 
a small number of particular judges. Since there is evidence that the judicial retirement age 
is addressing the pressing social need to improve the diversity of the judiciary, this is a 
good reason to find the retirement age justified. 
This argument is strengthened when we consider that the government settled on a 
retirement age of 70 after consultations between the Lord Chancellor and senior members 
of the judiciary. The retirement age, then, had backing from the democratically accountable 
government and from at least some members of the judiciary. It is appropriate to accord 
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weight to the fact that the government and the judiciary had worked together to strike a 
balance between the interests of older judges and others. We should accord weight to the 
democratic decision in balancing between the public benefit of the retirement age and its 
detrimental impact on some judges. Courts and tribunals should generally be reluctant to 
substitute their views of an appropriate balance between social policy goals with that of a 
democratically elected institution when the adverse effect of the impugned measure is 
modest and the policy supports an important social aim. Further, the fact that the 
government settled on the retirement age of 70 after consultations with the judiciary 
promotes the respect principle of the pluralist theory of age discrimination by ensuring the 
government sought and considered views from judges on the policy rather than unilaterally 
imposing the policy on the judiciary. The judicial retirement age, then, should be held to 
achieve an appropriate balance between competing interests at stake, and is reasonably 
necessary to achieving a legitimate aim, and therefore is objectively and reasonably 
justified under the Framework Directive.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has constructed a pluralist theory of age discrimination that can assist in 
distinguishing justified from unjustified age-differential treatment and therefore assist in 
identifying unlawful age discrimination under the Framework Directive. The theory 
consists of the following principles: efficiency (the requirement to maximise the gain in an 
important social good); equality of opportunity (the idea that inequality is wrong when it 
makes people worse off on grounds that someone cannot be held responsible for); social 
equality (the position that it is wrong when conditions produce hierarchies of status); 
respect (prohibiting expressions of insults or messages that certain people are worthy of 
lesser concern and respect) and autonomy (prohibiting actions that unfairly diminish a 
person's opportunities for autonomous agency).  
I have argued that this pluralist theory of age discrimination reveals that the judicial 
retirement age in the UK is justified by advancing equality of opportunity and social 
equality and that this gain justifies the detriment to older judges in being subject to the 
retirement age. The judicial retirement age advances equality of opportunity and social 
equality because it increases the turnover of judges and therefore increases the number of 
vacancies for younger people and underrepresented groups. While the retirement age 
violates social equality and autonomy from the perspective of older judges, this detriment 
is limited by the fact that the vast majority of judges choose to retire before the retirement 
age of 70. 
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Notes 
1. The default retirement age granted employers the opportunity to retire their employees 
at 65 years of age without having to demonstrate that the retirement age was objectively 
justified. The Employment Equality (Repeal of Retirement Age Provisions) Regulations 
2011 (SI 2011/1069) repealed the default mandatory retirement age. 
 
2. Section 26 of the Judicial Pensions and Retirement Age 1993 is a ‘requirement of an 
enactment’ mandating that judges retire before 70 years of age and therefore falls under 
the section 191 and schedule 22 Equality Act 2010 exception to the prohibition of age 
distinctions. 
 
3. If Blackham is correct that the judicial retirement age is unjustified, then judicial 
retirement ages will be unlawful even after the UK withdraws from the EU. This is because 
Article 3(1) of the Framework Directive, which holds that age distinctions relating to 
‘employment and working conditions’ are unlawful unless objectively justified, will 
continue to take effect in the UK once the UK withdraws from the EU. Clause 4 of the 
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill 2017-19 will make any rights that are recognised and 
available in domestic law by virtue of section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972 
to 'continue on and after exit day to be recognised and available in domestic law.' Provided 
a court or tribunal has recognised a right arising from a Directive prior to the UK's 
withdrawal from the EU, then Clause 4 holds that the right will be converted into domestic 
law. Since the ET in White v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKET/2201298/2013 recognised 
that the rights arising from Article 3(1) of the Framework Directive applies in the UK with 
the effect that the judicial retirement age is unlawful unless objectively justified, the right 
will be converted into domestic law under Clause 4. Clause 5(2) also provides that where 
there is a conflict between pre-exit domestic legislation and retained EU law, the 
supremacy of EU law will continue to apply. It follows that Article 3(1) of the Framework 
Directive will continue to apply over the domestic legislation with the effect that the 
judicial retirement age is unlawful unless objectively justified.  
 
4. The theory of age discrimination outlined in this article is discussed in more detail in my 
PhD thesis (2017) A Pluralist Theory of Age Discrimination. PhD thesis. Queen Mary, 
University of London, UK. 
 
5. The CJEU held in R (The Incorporated Trustees of the National Council on Ageing (Age 
Concern England) v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform C-
388/07 [2009] ECR I-1569 that the retirement ages engage the direct age discrimination 
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provisions of the Framework Directive and therefore are unlawful unless objectively 
justified. 
 
6. In Seldon v Clarkson, Wright and Jakes [2012] UKSC 16, [2012] ICR 716, the Supreme 
Court held this is the appropriate test for proportionality assessments in age discrimination 
cases. The CJEU in Fuchs and another v Land Hessen, Joined Cases C-159/10 and C-
160/10, [2011] 3 CMLR 47 held that it is essential that the proportionality test includes an 
assessment of the gravity of the effect upon the employees discriminated against and this 
being weighed against the importance of the legitimate aims in assessing the necessity of 
the particular measure chosen. 
 
7. This evidence was submitted to the ET in White and was used by the ET to justify the 
finding that the judicial retirement age is proportionate [16].  
 
8. The Children and Young Persons Act 1933 s 23 and s 24.  
 
 
9. Cupit (1998: 702) notes that ‘the alleged injustice of age discrimination presents a 
puzzle’ because the ‘[s]tandard argument against discrimination – the argument from 
equalizing benefits – seems not to apply.’ 
 
10. The compatibility of age discrimination with equality norms is discussed in detail by 
Daniels (1998) and McKerlie (1999). The argument has been used in R (Carson and 
Reynolds) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 37, [2010] ECHR 338 
to justify adopting a lower level of scrutiny for age distinctions than sex or race distinctions. 
Lord Walker justified this position on the grounds that age is different: 'Every human being 
starts life as a tiny infant, and none of us can do anything to stop the passage of the years' 
[80]. Younger people will eventually benefit from a provision which favours older 
employees and older employees will already have benefitted from a provision which 
favours younger people.   
 
11. In a similar example demonstrating the limitation of the equality of opportunity 
principle, McKerlie (1992) described a marriage in which ‘circumstances dictate that first 
the husband and then the wife take turns in being dominant and subordinate.’ Despite the 
fact that the husband and wife each have an equal amount of dominance, this is still an 
unjustified form of inequality. 
 
12. Elizabeth Anderson (1999) names this principle ‘democratic equality’. I use the name 
‘social equality’ because it better captures that this version of equality relates not just to 
participation in democracy but also participation in society. For an argument that 
discrimination is wrong because it violates social equality, see Bagenstos (2013).    
 
13. As David Miller (1999: 239) has stated:  
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[Social equality] does not require that people should be equal in power, prestige or 
wealth, nor, absurdly, that they should score the same on natural dimensions such 
as strength or intelligence. What matters is how such differences are regarded, and 
in particular whether they serve to construct a social hierarchy in which A can 
unequivocally be ranked as B’s superior. Where there is social equality, people feel 
that each member of the community enjoys an equal standing with all the rest that 
overrides their unequal ratings along particular dimensions.  
 
14. Gardner (1998) argued that much of what we consider wrong about paradigm cases of 
discrimination is in the actions of the discriminator. 
 
15. See the South African case Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie [2005] ZACC 19. The 
South African Supreme Court held that no provision made for same-sex marriages 
amounted to unfair discrimination. In the majority, Judge Sachs adopted the respect 
account of discrimination to justify his ruling: ‘To penalise people for being who and what 
they are is profoundly disrespectful of the human personality and violatory of equality. 
Equality means equal concern and respect across difference.’  
 
16. The respect account has a number of subtly different accounts of discrimination. One 
version locates the wrong of discrimination in the thought process of the discriminator, for 
example, identifying the wrong of discrimination in the treatment of people ‘with 
unwarranted contempt’ (Cavanagh, 2002); another version locates the wrong in the loss of 
self-respect of the victim of discrimination, for example, Lawrence Blum (2002) highlights 
that racism can lead to feelings of inferiority; and another locates the wrong in the ‘social 
meaning’ of the act of discrimination, for example, Deborah Hellman (2004) has argued 
that discrimination conveys the message that the victims of discrimination have a 
diminished moral and social worth.  
 
17. This pluralist approach to discrimination contrasts to unitary theories of discrimination 
that identify a single core principle that should explain all forms of discrimination. Unitary 
theories include Segall’s (2012) argument that discrimination wrongs people when it places 
the discriminatee at a disadvantage because of a trait that a person should not be held 
responsible for. Discrimination law, on this account, has a justifying aim of promoting 
equality of opportunity. Gardner’s (1998) account holds that discrimination is wrong when 
it has the effect of harming the capacity of people to live autonomous lives. The respect 
account holds that discrimination is wrong when it demeans people. 
 
18. Requiring that age discrimination law take into account all five principles will clearly 
lead to debate about the priorities between these underlying concerns when they clash. This 
raises the issue of how courts approach this value pluralism and decide among the different 
principles. Incommensurability of values is a problem for applying discrimination law 
because the Equality Act 2010 and the Framework Directive has a proportionality test that 
requires 'balancing' conflicting values in order to determine the legality of any impugned 
treatment. If values are plural and incommensurable, then there is difficulty determining 
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which value should prevail in any given case (See Marino, 2013 for an account of the 
difficulty of building coherence in moral theory given the fact of value pluralism). 
Choosing between competing incommensurable values raises difficult theoretical 
issues that may go beyond the remit of this article but for now it would be important to 
emphasise that the conclusion on proportionality should not be inferred from any particular 
belief, but from looking at the sum total of the principles that would be infringed by the 
impugned measure, related to the sum total of the principles that would be advanced. A 
judge must choose and this will mean that certain principles of my moral framework are 
promoted or vindicated while others are subordinated or sacrificed. Courts and tribunals 
must consider the most just outcome of a case, provide the reasons in support of it, and 
consider whether these reasons are more convincing than the reasons that support an 
alternative decision.  
 
19. These judicial diversity statistics are available on the government website (20 July 
2017) <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/judicial-diversity-
statistics-2017-1.pdf> accessed 26th February 2018. 
 
20. Robert Alexy (2005) describes the proportionality assessment as follows: ‘The greater 
the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater the importance 
of satisfying the other.’  
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